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Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled 
(Robinett, Anantavrasilpa & Hickey, 2013). It determines the activities in which corporations 
are properly engaged (Brown, Beekes & Verhoeven, 2011). The corporate governance 
function is intended to develop ownership and governance structures for companies to ensure 
that managers behave ethically and make decisions that benefit shareholders (Fauzi & Locke, 
2012). 
 
Since corporate governance is used to run companies and the board of directors is responsible 
for governance and the development of a company’s strategy (Pass, 2004), it is expected that 
corporate performance is affected by corporate governance attributes. However, it should be 
noted that performance measurements might include other attributes rather than corporate 
governance mechanisms. Performance measurement provides the information needed to 
assess the extent to which an organisation delivers value and achieves excellence. This 
definition also relates well to the balanced scorecard. The usual four scorecard dimensions 
include financial, customer, internal processes, innovation and learning are implied: financial 
aspects are included in “delivering value”, customers and stakeholders are key to the 
definition, while internal processes, innovation and learning are central to the way 
organisations are managed (Moullin, 2007). 
 
Corporate governance has become a prominent topic over at least the last two decades.  One 
of the reasons for this prominence is the events surrounding a series of recent US scandals 
and corporate failures of the late 1990s (Becht, Bolton & Roell, 2002). Existing studies have 
explored the relationship between corporate governance attributes and corporate performance 
in various countries, e.g., Australia (Balatbat, Taylor & Walter, 2004), China (Claessens & 
Djankov, 1999; Xu & Wang, 1999; Hovey, Li  & Naughton, 2003; Bai, Liu, Lu, Song & 
Zhang, 2004; Li & Naughton, 2007), Italy (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2012), Malaysia 
(Abdullah, 2006; Zakaria, Purhanudin & Palanimally, 2014; Abidin, Kamal & Jusoff, 2009), 
New Zealand (Fauzi & Locke, 2012), Spain (Arosa, Iturralde & Maseda, 2010), and the UK 
(Weir & Laing, 2001).  
 
In Thailand, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 highlighted the importance of good corporate 
governance for the long-term survival of companies. Since the 1997 financial crisis, or “the 
Tom Yum Kung Crisis,” the concept of good corporate governance has gained popularity in 
Thailand because it has been claimed that this economic crisis was connected to the poor 
quality of corporate governance and the crony economy (Alba, Claessens & Djankov, 1998; 
Dhnadirek & Tang, 2003). 
 
After 1997, many researchers attempted to explore the relationship between alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms as put forth by theories on firm performance. The Thai 
Stock Exchange Committee and concerned parties focused their attention on the roles that 
management, boards of directors, and controlling shareholders play in overseeing a firm’s 
performance (Panyasrivanit, 2005).  
 
Several studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, 
ownership structure, and firm performance across countries with different characteristics, 
with the majority being developed countries. The studies yielded different results, affected by 
the nature of the prevailing governance system for each country.  
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In Thailand, there exist a number of studies which explored the influence of board and 
ownership structure on corporate performance and suggested that these corporate governance 
attributes influence significantly the performance of a company. The significant corporate 
governance attributes suggested by previous studies as affecting corporate performance 
include ownership concentration (Alba et al., 1998; Dhnadirek & Tang, 2003), family-
controlled characteristics (Suehiro, 2001; Wiwattanakantang, 2001), board composition 
(Connelly & Limpaphayom, 2004), and managerial ownership (Kim, Kitsabunnarat & 
Nofsinger, 2004). 
 
Though the impact of board and ownership structures on Thai firms' performance has been 
extensively studied in recent years, the results remain inconclusive. Thus, this study focuses 
on exploring the impacts of board and ownership structures on the performance of Thai non-
financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).  
 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) propose that a good corporate governance 
framework can benefit a firm through easier financing, lower costs of capital, improved 
stakeholder favour, and overall better company performance (Fauzi & Locke, 2012). This 
study focuses particularly on various aspects of the structure of a board and how they affect 
the performance of a firm. These aspects of board structure included board size, board 
independence, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, board gender diversity, and board 
political connections.  
 
Investigating Thai listed firms could add diversity to the growing body of work examining 
board structures. This research attempts to extend the research on agency theory, first 
purposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), by focusing on the impact of  the ownership 
mechanism on firm performance in an emerging country, Thailand. Studying Thai firms will 
be interesting because the ownership structure in Thailand has a distinctive characteristic. 
According to Wiwattanakantang (2001), previous studies suggest that dispersedly-held 
corporations described in the model of Berle and Means (1932) are actually less common in 
countries outside the US and UK. Even in other developed countries, the concentrated 
ownership structure is more universal. Specifically, about 64% of large firms in the 27 richest 
countries have controlling shareholders (La-Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). In 
Thailand, about 80% of non-financial companies traded on the SET are family-owned 
(Wiwattanakantang, 2000). Furthermore, Chienwittayakun and Mankin (2015) pointed out 
that family owned businesses account for 95% of the total enterprises in Thailand. According 
to Cracknell (2019), family-run businesses in Thailand have a combined net worth of 
approximately THB 30 trillion, out of a total net worth of THB 42 trillion from all Thai 
businesses. Around 80% of all businesses in Thailand are owned or controlled by families, 
with an impressive figure of approximately three-fourth of all businesses listed on the SET 
are family-run businesses. Therefore, it will be interesting to see how the ownership structure 
will affect firm performance, especially in an environment in which information asymmetry 
is likely to be high. The scope of ownership structure, in this study, includes the top three 
shareholders (TOP 3) and family shareholders. 
 
Therefore, this research investigates the effects of board and ownership structures on the 
performance of the companies listed on the SET during the period 2001-2014. Fixed effects 
and random effects panel regression analysis will be employed to explore such relationships.  
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It is expected that the study findings will provide insights into the various parties who are 
interested in participating in the Thai stock market. It is also important for regulators and 
policy makers to understand the corporate governance mechanism and its effect on firm 
performance. In addition, the results of this study will show how board and ownership 
structures influence listed firms' performance in Thailand. Firms in Thailand are generally 
smaller than those situated in developed countries, so unquestioning compliance with 
different codes and principles from elsewhere is inappropriate for Thai firms. The codes and 
principles may have to be customised to fit specific contextual needs in Thailand.  
 
The following section will describe the background and literature review, then the data and 
econometric method will be presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5 contains the discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance in Thailand: The Significance and Reform 
 
Corporate governance refers to the structures and processes for the direction and control of 
companies (Robinett et al., 2013). The basic tenets of corporate governance are 
accountability, responsibility, equitable treatment, transparency, vision, and ethics 
(Limpaphayom & Connelly, 2004). The structure of corporate governance consists of three 
primary groups of people: shareholders, boards of directors, and executives. Their roles 
involve groups of secondary people, including stakeholders, and audit and independent 
committees. Good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic development by 
enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their access to outside capital 
(Robinett et al., 2013). 
 
For emerging market countries, improving corporate governance can serve a number of 
important public policy objectives. Good corporate governance reduces emerging market 
vulnerability to financial crises, reinforces property rights, reduces transaction costs and the 
cost of capital, and leads to capital market development. Weak corporate governance 
frameworks reduce investor confidence and can discourage outside investment. 
 
In Thailand, the 1997 financial crisis resulted in 56 financial firms being shuttered by the 
government. Several banks closed and were either taken over by the government or merged 
into larger rivals. Several of the remaining banks were forced to seek strategic foreign 
investors to speed their recovery. Weak corporate governance practices played a major role in 
these difficulties.  
 
Limpaphayom and Connelly (2004) clearly pointed out that, as the 1997 financial crisis 
unfolded in Thailand, it became apparent that weak corporate governance practices may have 
intensified the severity of the problems. In particular, Thailand faced corporate governance 
problems in two areas. Firstly, poor governance practices at the firm-level included 
overinvestment and over-borrowing, among many others. Furthermore, Thai publicly traded 
companies were largely family-owned, with family and related-party shareholders as the 
controlling shareholders. These situations resulted in negative consequences for minority 
shareholders since the controlling shareholders were likely to expropriate the firm’s 
resources.  
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Secondly, Thai companies typically relied on bank financing rather than capital market 
financing to secure funds for growth. Banks, as the main suppliers of corporate financing, 
should serve a vital monitoring role for their borrowers. However, the banks, themselves, 
were suffering from poor governance practices in many cases.  
 
In Thailand, the foundations for good governance practices pre-dated the 1997 financial 
crisis. Laws and regulations covering public companies, the securities exchange, bankruptcy, 
accounting and disclosure standards, and other requirements were already on the books 
(Limpaphayom & Connelly, 2004). The key ingredients missing from wider acceptance of 
good governance practices were incentives and enforcement.  
 
In 2012, the Principles of Corporate Governance for Thailand were made to be compatible 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Corporate Governance Scorecard 
criterion, which assesses and ranks listed companies’ corporate governance practices. 
Recently, the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) (Robinett et al., 
2013), confirmed Thailand as a regional leader in corporate governance with a relatively 
comprehensive framework and having achieved high levels of compliance in a number of key 
areas.  
 
It could be concluded that, over the past several years, the importance of corporate 
governance has been highlighted by an increasing body of research. Though the influence of 
corporate governance attributes on Thai firms' performance has been extensively studied in 
recent years, the results remain inconclusive. This study will add empirical results and 
knowledge about corporate governance to the field. 
 
2.2 Board Structure and Firm Performance 
 
2.2.1 Board Size 
 
Board size varies from board to board, depending on factors such as type of firm, firm size, 
and board culture. Overall, what is the best size for a board of directors? The number of 
board members is considered to be one of the factors affecting firm performance, but there is 
no one optimal size for a board (Fauzi & Locke, 2012).  
 
There are some perspectives on how large a firm’s board size should be. From an agency 
perspective, it can be argued that a larger board is more likely to be vigilant in terms of 
agency problems simply because a greater number of people will be reviewing management 
actions. From a resource dependence theory perspective, it can be argued that a larger board 
brings greater opportunities for more links and, hence, access to resources. Organizations 
should increase board size to maximize the provision of resources for the organization. 
 
From a stewardship theory perspective, it is the ratio of inside to outside directors that is of 
relevance, since inside directors can bring superior information to the board for decision-
making. Larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and skills at their disposal, and the 
abundance of perspectives that they assemble are likely to enhance healthy conflict.  
 
There are a number of studies that have investigated whether or not board size has an effect 
on firm performance. Some studies found a positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance, for example, Goktan, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2006), and Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006). However, Jensen (1986) suggests that smaller boards enhance 
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communication, cohesiveness, and co-ordination, which makes monitoring more effective. 
Studies which found results supporting this concept include Eisenberga, Sundgrenb, and 
Wells (1998) and Yermack (1996). 
 
 Though the results are inconclusive, it is assumed that larger boards provide more expertise, 
greater management oversight, and access to a wider range of resources. Therefore, the first 
research hypothesis is established, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Board size positively affects firm performance. 
 
2.2.2 Board Independence 
 
The board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance. They help solve 
agency problems inherent in an organization because they perform internal control 
mechanisms designed to monitor the actions of top management. However, the board does 
not always act on behalf of shareholders. In general, a board dominated by inside directors 
may not be able to fulfil its supervisory function properly (Panyasrivanit, 2005). Therefore, 
numerous studies have explored the effect of board independence on firm performance (Fauzi 
& Locke, 2012). One important mechanism of board structure is the composition of the 
board. An independent board examines company decisions, balances the company 
administration, controls decisions, and eliminates conflicts of interest between the 
shareholders and management team, and, according to the agency theory of administrators, 
performs these duties more efficiently than dependent boards. The agency theory states 
further that people are motivated to advance personal interests (Letza, Kirkbride, Sun & 
Smallman, 2008). A board composed of external parties will act to protect the interests of all 
shareholders, in all groups, who are unlikely to confront the executive director, and examine 
efficiently the administrative department’s operation (Hu, Tam, & Tan,  2010) because they 
must to retain their reputations. This causes the independent board to become an essential 
asset to corporate governance, one that will be able to reduce problems arising from the 
representatives. A study by Jiamsagul (2007) found that a higher proportion of independent 
board members can reduce the agency problem and improve operations (Pietra, Grambovas, 
Raonic & Riccaboni, 2008; Apadore and Zainol, 2014).  
 
However, other studies argue that outside directors will not necessarily act in shareholder 
interest since CEOs often dominate the director nomination process (Panyasrivanit, 2005). 
The research hypothesis for this section follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of independent directors on a board positively  
 affects firm performance. 
 
2.2.3 CEO Duality 
 
A dual leadership structure, or CEO duality, exists when a firm’s CEO also serves as 
chairman of the board of directors. If different individuals serve in these positions, then the 
term ‘independent structure’ is used. 
 
The evidence regarding the effect of CEO duality on corporate performance is mixed (Arthur, 
Garvey, Swan, & Taylor, 1993; Pi & Timme, 1993). Some studies, for example, Fama and 
Jensen (1983), Rechner and Dalton (1991), Jensen (1993), Daily and Dalton (1994), and 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), argue that a board on which the chairperson and CEO are the 
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same person is ineffective because the CEO duality structure reduces the board’s ability to 
fulfil its governance function, perhaps constituting a clear conflict of interest. In contrast, 
advocates of the CEO duality structure argue that it provides a single, clear focus for 
objectives and operations (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). 
 
It should be noted that Elsayed (2007) found that CEO duality has no impact on corporate 
performance.  
 
The chairman of the board should be chosen from an independent committee and should not 
be the same person as the Managing Director or CEO in order to divide responsibilities in 
policy determination and regular administration (The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 1999). 
This also provides a management system with a balance of power (Pannarong, 2010).  
 
The research hypothesis will be:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The presence of duality negatively affects firm performance.  
 
2.2.4 Board Gender Diversity 
 
The issue of gender in board diversity is especially timely, given the current movement in 
Europe to increase the number of women on boards. According to Fauzi and Locke (2012), 
the concept of gender diversity is supported by the theoretical literature; for example, from an 
agency theory perspective, an increase in diversity will provide a balanced board that will 
ensure that no individual can dominate the decision-making. From a resource dependency 
viewpoint, the increase in board diversity may well provide linkages to additional resources, 
and, from a stakeholder perspective, diversity provides representation for different 
stakeholders.  
 
Women have been accepted into business more frequently, and this trend seems to be 
increasing (Cole, 1997). In the past, the participation of women in family businesses was 
difficult due to their gender (Lyman, 1988), but, at present, women are in a better position to 
inherit a business and take a leading role in organizational leadership (Phondej, Kittisarn & 
Neck,  2010).  
 
Many researchers are interested in the study of business management as performed by 
women, such as Yasser (2012), Langdon McMenamin and Krolik (2002), Azmi and Barrett 
(2013), Vandergrift and Brown (2005) and Wei (2007).  
 
The principles of corporate governance revised for firms listed on the SET included a focus 
on the structure of the board. According to the Principles, boards should consist of equitable 
committees with diverse qualifications in terms of skills, experience, and specific abilities 
and a focus on gender equity. These guidelines suggest including at least one woman in the 
boardroom who is not an executive director, but who has experience in the business or 
industry in which the company operates. This suggests that gender diversity is important and 
engenders trust in women to manage large national companies. The research hypothesis for 
this section is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The proportion of female board directors positively affects firm  
 performance. 
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2.2.5 Political Connections 
 
There are mixed results on how political connections impact firm performance. Some studies 
argue that political connections positively affect firm performance, such as Su and Fung 
(2013) and Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou (2008), while some studies, such as Saeed, Belghitar 
and Clark (2015), claim that political connections negatively affect firm performance.  
 
Furthermore, the literature could be grouped into two main arguments based on the 
relationship between government ownership and firm performance. The first argument 
supports the negative effects of government ownership on firm performance, as seen in 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), for example. This study suggests that governments are likely to 
pay special attention to political goals, such as low output price, employment, and many 
external factors, that may be negatively related to firm performance. Furthermore, firms with 
mixed control experienced poor performance due to ambiguity of ownership control, property 
rights, agency issues, profits, and welfare objectives (Zakaria et al., 2014). Other studies that 
also found a similar conclusion include Xu and Wang (1997), Qi, Wu, and Zhang (2000), 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), and Chen (2001).  
 
The second argument supports the positive effect of government ownership on firm 
performance by suggested that, in the developing countries, government-controlled firms are 
considered separate entities because they are operating in monopoly markets, which may give 
rise to superior performances (Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Panyasrivanit, 2005).  
 
In addition, other studies also claim there is a positive relationship between government-
controlled firms and performance and discuss some feasible reasons, such as government-
controlled firms are likely to obtain capital at low cost as a result of political connections 
(Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), the government can face any difficulties and put effort into 
enhancing the company in order to maintain the equality and stability of the economy (Najid 
& Abdul Rahman, 2011; Eng & Mak, 2003), and government-controlled firms obtain more 
information and find it easier to obtain financing from different channels than non-state firms 
(Zakaria et al., 2014). 
 
After reviewing those two arguments, the research hypothesis is set as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between the board’s political  
 connections and firm performance. 
 
2.3 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
 
2.3.1 Family Ownership  
 
There are two opposite arguments associated with an individual or a group of family 
members as controlling shareholder(s). Many studies point out that a family is likely to put 
the interests of the family above the interests of other stakeholders. Due to immense voting 
power and frequent involvement in management, families can implement policies that benefit 
themselves which are detrimental to firm performance (La-Porta et al., 1999; 
Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Panyasrivanit, 2005). Additionally, Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) 
and Arosa et al (2010) state that there is negative impact on company performance when 
control is passed to the next generation of a family. In particular, when family firms are run 
by descendent-CEOs, those firms are worse off than they would have been had they been 
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nonfamily firms, in which they would have been exposed to classic agency conflict with 
managers.  
 
Another group of literature claims that family members provide good monitoring in family-
controlled firms, resulting in lower agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; DeAngelo & 
DeAngelo, 1985; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Panyasrivanit, 2005). Family members have 
incentives to increase the firm’s value and be good monitors because their wealth is linked to 
the continuation of the firm. A possible explanation for the positive effect of family-
controlled firms on performance is that there is a close tie between the family and firm as the 
family’s last name is commonly used in the company name. Therefore, monitoring and 
disciplining of management by family members could be efficient (Wiwattanakantang, 2001; 
Panyasrivanit, 2005; Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999).  
 
After reviewing those two arguments, the first argument may prevail in Thailand. Therefore, 
the research hypothesis is set as:  
 
Hypothesis 6: Family ownership negatively affects firm performance.  
 
2.3.2 Blockholders’ Ownership  
 
According to Wiwattanakantang (2001), controlling shareholders, or blockholders, are 
defined based on Thai corporate law. Specifically, a shareholder is a controlling shareholder 
if he owns at least 25% of a company’s shares. At this level of ownership, a shareholder has a 
legal right to nullify any corporate decision. 
 
The role of blockholders is likely to vary over time periods and countries as a function of the 
legal system and other regulations. Previous literature documents that there are both costs and 
benefits associated with ownership concentration. The presence of blockholders, or 
controlling shareholders, may increase the agency problem because the controlling 
shareholders’ interests may not align with those of non-controlling shareholders (La-Porta et 
al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Controlling shareholders may pay out the companies’ 
cash flows to themselves in several ways, including simply paying themselves excessive 
salaries and dividends,  and giving top executive positions and board seats to unqualified 
family members (Wiwattanakantang, 2001).  
 
However, the presence of controlling shareholders may not necessarily be detrimental to the 
firm. Some studies found that blockholders' ownership is likely to reduce agency costs 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Admati, Pfleiderer & Zechner,  1994). Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
report that blockholders' ownership is positively related to the performance sensitivity of 
managerial compensation.  
 
On the other hand, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) argue that blockholders have neither 
the time nor expertise to act as effective monitors. Furthermore, Singh and Davidson (2003) 
found no evidence that blockholders' ownership affects agency costs.  
 
According to Parigi and Pelizzon (2008), the measure of ownership concentration is the 
percentage of shares owned by the TOP 3. Accordingly, this study takes the shares of the top 
three shareholders as a proxy for the shares of the controlling shareholder or blockholders' 
ownership, under the assumption that all the largest shareholders are potentially able to obtain 
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control benefits. This study will explore the effect of blockholders' ownership measured by 
TOP 3 shareholders on firm performance. Therefore, the research hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between blockholders' ownership and  
 firm performance. 
 
3. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHOD 
 
3.1 Data and Variables 
 
To achieve the objective, the sample consists of all companies listed on the SET between 
2001 and 2014. However, firms belonging to the financial sector are excluded from the 
analysis because their financial statements differ from those of the other groups. Data 
regarding the annual reports of listed companies were collected from the DataStream 
database.  
Table 1 presents the variables and definitions used in the study. 
 
Table 1: Definitions of Variables Used in This Study 
 
Variable Definition 
Firm performance: ROA  
(Return on Assets) 
Ratio of profit before interest and tax to total assets. 
Independent variables   
Board structure: Board size The total number of board members. 
 Board independence The proportion of independent directors to the total 
number of board members. 
 CEO duality If the chairperson and CEO are the same person, this 
variable is assigned a value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
 Board gender diversity The proportion of female directors on the board. 
 Political connection If the board has political connections, the variable is 
assigned a value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
Ownership structure      
Ownership concentration: TOP 3 shareholders The proportion of top 3 shareholders. 
 Family shareholders If the family holds at least 10% of shares, the variable 
is assigned a value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
Control variables: Firm size  Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
3.2 Econometric Methodology 
 
This study uses panel data, which allows the unobservable heterogeneity for each observation 
in the sample to be eliminated and multicollinearity among variables to be alleviated. 
Descriptive analysis, Pearson correlation analysis, and fixed effects and random effects panel 
regressions analysis will be employed as the underlying statistical tests.  
 
The fixed effects and random effects panel regressions analysis is performed using the 
following equation: 
 
PERi,t = β0 + β1∗B-Size + β2∗B-Ind + β3∗DUAL + β4∗GENDER+ β5∗POL + β6∗ FAM 
+β7*TOP3  + β8* F-Size +  e 
 
where PERi,t is the firm performance measured by ROA for company i at time t, B-Size is the 
board size, B-Ind is the measure of board independence, DUAL is the presence of CEO 
duality, GENDER represents board gender diversity, POL is the presence of board political 
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connections, FAM is the presence of a family-controlled firm, TOP3 is the proportion of top 3 
shareholders, F-Size is the firm size, and e is the random error term. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. The average ROA 
for the sample, as a whole, is 8.29%. During the time period 2001-2014, the average board 
size for the sample is approximately 11.18, while the board independent average is 32.62%.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables, 2001-2014 
 
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
ROA 0.0829 0.0801 20.3687 -1.5177 0.4096 
BD_SIZE 11.1798 11.0000 26.0000 0.0000 3.1262 
BD_IND 0.3262 0.3333 0.8000 0.0000 0.1177 
CEO_DUAL 0.1235 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3291 
BD_WOMEN 1.8531 2.0000 9.0000 0.0000 1.6069 
POLITICAL 0.3772 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4848 
OWN_TOP3 55.9354 55.8400 99.8700 5.7100 19.5277 
FAM 0.6217 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4850 
F_SIZE 14.9867 14.7297 20.4468 10.9627 1.4868 
Note: ROA = Return on Assets, BD_SIZE = Board size, BD_IND = Board independence, CEO_DUAL = CEO 
duality, BD_WOMEN = Board gender diversity, POLITICAL = Political connection, OWN_TOP3 = Top 3 
shareholders, FAM = Family shareholders and F_SIZE = Firm size. 
 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficients matrix for the variables is reported in Table 3 and is used 
to examine the correlations between variables. The results indicate a weak relationship 
between the independent variables, which implies that there is no multicollinearity problem.
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix of the Variables, 2001-2014 
 
ROA BD_SIZE BD_IND CEO_DUAL BD_WOMEN POLITICAL OWN_TOP3 FAM F_SIZE 
ROA 1.0000                 
   -                 
BD_SIZE 0.0068 1.0000               
  (0.7176)  -               
BD_IND  -0.0562*  -0.3427* 1.0000             
  (0.0028) (0.0000)  -             
CEO_DUAL -0.0143  -0.0656* -0.0061 1.0000           
  (0.4466) (0.0005) (0.7455)  -           
BD_WOMEN -0.0059 0.1081*  -0.0817* 0.0926* 1.0000         
  (0.7526) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  -         
POLITICAL -0.0164 0.1750* 0.0030 -0.0369 -0.0366 1.0000       
  (0.3828) (0.0000) (0.8716) (0.0496) (0.0520)  -       
OWN_TOP3 0.0084 -0.1039* 0.0004 0.0787* -0.0384 0.0159 1.0000     
  (0.6549) (0.0000) (0.9822) (0.0000) (0.0410) (0.3995)  -     
FAM -0.0176 0.0124 0.0201 0.0510* 0.2194* -0.0102 -0.2312* 1.0000   
  (0.3487) (0.5096) (0.2860) (0.0066) (0.0000) (0.5886) (0.0000)  -   
F_SIZE 0.0141 0.2754* 0.0211 -0.0219  -0.1861* 0.1075* 0.0220  -0.1829* 1.0000 
  (0.4530) (0.0000) (0.2624) (0.2444) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2418) (0.0000)  - 




4.3 Random Effects Panel Regressions Analysis 
 
We ran a Hausman test and found that a random effects model is more appropriate than a 
fixed effect model for the data in this study. The empirical results of the estimation of the 
random effects model with performance measurements for the observations for the period 
2001-2014 are displayed in Tables 4.  
 
Table 4: Estimation Results for Random Effects Regression Analysis  
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.1087 0.0923 1.1779 0.2389 
BD_SIZE -0.0022 0.0029 -0.7704 0.4411 
BD_IND -0.2173* 0.0708 -3.0701 0.0022 
CEO_DUAL -0.0200 0.0239 -0.8367 0.4028 
BD_WOMEN -0.0006 0.0051 -0.1174 0.9065 
POLITICAL -0.0135 0.0163 -0.8254 0.4092 
FAM -0.0088 0.0171 -0.5171 0.6051 
OWN_TOP3 0.0001 0.0004 0.2465 0.8053 
F_SIZE 0.0052 0.0057 0.9154 0.3601 
Notes: No. of Observations = 2,826, Adjusted R-squared = 0.0015, *Significant at the 1% level 
 
According to the regression results in Table 4, BD_IND is negatively related to ROA at the 1 
% significance level. These results show that a higher board independence level leads to 
lower performance. However, other independent variables are not significantly related to 
corporate performance. 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper investigated the effect of board and ownership structures on the performance of 
the listed companies on the SET during the period 2001-2014.  
 
In Thailand, some studies have explored the impact of board and ownership structures on 
firm performance, but the results were inconclusive. This study tried to fill the gap in this 
field by investigating the effects of board and ownership structures on firm performance 
using Thailand as a case study. The data for 2,826 observations is included in this paper. 
Financial data from 2001-2014 are used in random effects panel regression analysis. 
 
A firm’s board independence was found to have a significant and negative impact on the 
firm’s performance measures. This result is consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), 
who also found a negative effect of a larger fraction of outside directors on firm performance 
in OLS estimations. The result suggests that boards might contain too many outsiders. In 
addition, the potential drawbacks of having outside directors include, firstly, they might be 
less informed about the company than insiders which refer to “information gap”, specifically, 
and outsiders may operate at an information disadvantage that can limit their effectiveness. 
Secondly, they might not behave with true independence or they might be “co-opted” by 
management.  Finally, they are not always adequately qualified or engaged. Shareholders 
should evaluate director talent on a company-by-company basis to determine their 
qualification for directorship (Larcker and Tayan, 2019). Refer to the study results, the 
interesting further research could be investigating more about the composition of the board 
skills or knowledge and the relationships brought to the companies by independent directors 
in Thailand. 
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Furthermore, the results suggested that board structure, board independence excluded, 
ownership structure, and firm size are not significantly related to corporate performance. 
 
In addition, due to the fact that approximately 80% of non-financial companies traded on the 
SET are family-owned, it was interesting to investigate how ownership structure affected 
firm performance, especially in an environment in which information asymmetry is likely to 
be high. It should be noted that this study does not find evidence to support the hypothesis 
that family ownership negatively affects firm performance. Specifically, we found that there 
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